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ABSTRACT
THAPA, SADHIKA RAJESHWARI. Understanding the Factors Behind China’s Economic
Growth and their Impact on Growth Trends in the Future
ADVISOR: Eshragh Motahar
Since the implementation of economic reforms in 1979, the Chinese economy has
transformed to one of the fastest growing economies in Real GDP terms. China’s GDP growth
averaged at 9.19 percent, annually, between 1989 to 2021. In 2018, the World Bank described
this growth as being the fastest sustained expansion in history. This thesis aims to understand the
factors behind China’s impressive economic growth. The empirical framework estimates the
impact of Total Factor Productivity (TFP), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and Openness on
China’s Real GDP. The results indicate that a 10% increase in TFP, FDI and Openness leads to a
7.7%, 7.5% and 0.5% increase in Real GDP respectively. TFP remains positive and statistically
significant throughout the three regression models, indicating that TFP plays a crucial role in
China’s Real GDP. More recently China’s economy has shown signs of slowing down, the
International Monetary Fund projects the growth rate to fall to 5.5% by 2024. China’s rapid
economic growth is reminiscent to the economic growth of its East Asian neighbors like Japan
and the Four Asian Tigers after the end of World War 2. I also compare the growth model of
China to the one implemented by Japan and the Four Asian Tigers to analyze whether China’s
economy will experience a similar abrupt slowdown. The Chinese government’s role in resource
allocation cannot be over looked. As China shifts its focus to rebalancing its economic growth to
escape the middle-income trap, the Xi Jinping administration is playing a greater role in resource
allocation. In order to get a holistic picture of China’s economic growth in the future it is
important to consider government initiatives to maximize productivity, therefore, this paper also
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analyzes recent news from China about economic goals, the Belts and Road initiative, and the
Made in China 2025. This paper finds that Chinese government’s economic policies need to be
more effective to increase efficiency in the long run.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the research question, its significance and the contribution of this
paper to existing literature. This chapter also outlines the rest of this paper.
a. Statement of Core Research Question
My research question is what factors have led to the economic growth of China and
whether these factors will continue helping the Chinese economy’s growth trend. The Chinese
economy has been able to grow at a substantially high rate even after economic crises like the
Asian Financial Crisis and the Great Recession of 2008. However, China’s GDP growth in the
third quarter of this year grew by 4.9% compared to 7.9% in the last quarter. 2021 marks the
beginning of China’s 14th Five years plan to become a modernized socialist economy, which is
keen on increasing more high-tech production, semiconductors in particular. Despite an initial
recovery from the effects of COVID 19, the below expected growth rate in the third quarter of
this year has raised questions about economic slowdown. Crackdown on technology, private
education, and the real estate sector plays into this slowdown. Given China’s importance in the
world economy, this slowdown may hurt the world economic growth. The Chinese economy
accounts for 15% of global trade and a quarter of the projected world economic growth for the
next four years. The IMF predicts the that the Chinese economy will grow at 4.8% in 2022 and
5.2% in 2023, a sharp decline from its 8% growth rate between 2014 to 2019. The Chinese
central bank however, remains optimistic projecting an economic growth between 5.1% to 5.7%
until 2025 (Xie, 2022).
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Currently China is trying to escape the middle-income trap, which requires economic
reforms. The World Bank defines the middle-income economies as those economies that have a
per capita income between $1,000 to $12,235. Since 2015, China is an upper middle-income
country. The middle-income trap is defined by an inability to successfully shift to modern
services as the country lack the necessary infrastructure. At the same time the wage of workers is
increasing and therefore, decreasing the export driven growth. Diversification of the economy,
types of good exported, and structural changes are very important as it enables reallocating
resources from activities with low productivity to high productivity helping the economy escape
the middle-income trap.
What makes the economic growth of China particularly interesting is that it is
transitioning from a planned economy to a semi-market economy. Many Asian countries have
made this kind of transition in the past and experienced high rates of economic growth even
though their pre-transition condition may not be identical. Export promotion and rapid
industrialization played an important role in achieving this high growth rate. The Four Asian
Tigers serve as a model for other developing countries, and we can certainly see that China’s
economic growth has been elevated by similar factors. The economic growth of the Four Asian
Tigers dwindled after the Asian Financial Crisis. While Japan was ineffective in responding to
the Asian Financial Crisis, China implemented effective policies and gradually shifting the
balance of power in the region to its favor. This leads to the question, will China’s economic
growth experience such a slowdown in the near future since these economies have had a similar
growth trend. The success of Asian economies and their growth model have raised many debates,
especially over interventionist industrial policies. Scholars argue that once Japan, Korea,
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan caught up with the level of technological advancement as
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that of the west, the model didn’t produce such high levels of growth. However, the growth
strategy adopted by these Asian countries enabled them to make a mark in the world market and
substantially improve the standards of living of their population (Garran, 1998).

b. Significance of Contribution
I contribute to literature by looking at multiple factors’ contribution to China’s economic
growth. Current literature tends to focus only on one factor’s growth trend. This paper includes
all the factors that helped China’s economic growth as indicated by previous literature and helps
highlight which of these factors has been playing a consistent role in increasing China’s GDP
growth. The results can then be used to analyze China’s current reforms and initiative to predict
whether China’s economic growth will slow down or not. I will be looking at more recent events
like the Belts and Road initiative, Made in China 2025 and their potential impact on these factors
to discuss China’s economic growth in the near future. My paper will also focus on looking at
more recent news from China about factors like education and FDI to better understand China’s
economic growth in the future. This is a significant contribution because most literature on
China’s economic growth mathematically extrapolates China’s economic growth. In order to do
so they assume that the growth and contribution of the factors remains constant overtime.
However, in the case of China this assumption may not be ideal because the Chinese government
has great control over the economy and resource allocation. The Chinese Communist Party under
Xi Jinping seeks greater state control, which is in contrast to the vision of Deng Xiaoping who
engineered the economic reforms in China in 1978. The government’s reform initiatives have
been crucial to China’s economic growth. Therefore, it is important, especially when analyzing
China’s recent economic growth slowdown, to consider government reforms.
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c. Structure of thesis
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter Two gives readers a historical
background on the China’s economy and important government reforms. The purpose of chapter
Two is to highlight the role of the CCP in controlling factor allocation to increase productivity.
Chapter Three offers a review of the relevant literature on factors that have affected China’s
economic growth. Chapter Three also compares the factors that have led to China’s economic
growth to those that enabled the economic growth of Japan and the East Asian Tigers. The last
section of Chapter Three also highlights recent news from China pertaining to the factors that
affects China’s economic growth. Chapter Four presents the analytical framework to answer my
thesis question and the data description. Chapter Five presents the regression results its
interpretation, and implication for China’s economic growth. Chapter Six provide a conclusion.
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CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CHINESE ECONOMY

This chapter provides an overview of China’s economy after the end of World War 2 and
the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Section A highlights the initial
economic reforms implemented by the CCP under the leadership of Mao Zedong. During this
time China aimed to improve its industrial productivity and be self-sufficient to decrease
interaction with the capitalist West. Section B focuses on the opening of the Chinese economy
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and China rise as a manufacturing hub. During this time
China’s productivity and Foreign Direct investment increased significantly, aiding the country’s
economic growth. In Section 3, I look at more recent initiatives like the Belts and Road Initiative
(BRI) and the Made in Chines 2025 initiative undertaken by the Xi Jinping administration and
their impact on China’s productivity. Looking at these initiative gives us a better picture of how
factor productivity of China will be affected in the future. The purpose of this chapter is to
highlight the extent of the Chinese government’s control over the economy. Unlike the Western
government that exercise free market allocation of resources, the Chinese government controls
the allocation of its resources to a great extent to produce optimal results. Especially right now as
it hopes to increase its economic productivity in order to escape the middle-income trap.

a. Mao’s Reforms
In 1957 the Chinese Communist Party leaders, who had recently gained control of China
from Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party, realized a plan to fix China’s agricultural and
industrial shortage. They had asked cadres to go into the countryside and increase production.
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The Great Leap forward encouraged production by forming backyard furnaces and communes
although they weren’t as efficient and effective as they were presumed to be. The vision was to
get the country out of the risk of famine and let the people know what the communist ideology
really was. Chairman Mao had got the idea from his visit to Soviet Union that same year. The
furnace was used to melt scrap steel in to usable steel so that China wouldn’t have to rely on
imports. And the communes were built to encourage more women to participate in agriculture
and manufacturing. The communes facilitated daycare for children and food for all members of
the commune so that most women are freed from their household duties and are able to
participate in production. Desperate to meet the production quotas workers would melt personal
items as the penalty for not meeting the quotas were high. The steel produced from these
furnaces were of low quality. Agriculture production went well for the first year as the soil was
in good condition but as more workers were being allocated to the production of steel, the crops
started rotting. Cadres had an incentive to report high numbers to the leadership as they too
feared repercussion. Since cadres were reporting such high numbers, the agricultural products
were being taken to the more urban regions for even distribution of crops. This left many rural
communes without enough food. The already starving population was hit by a massive flood in
1959. After failing to increase the GDP of China, the Great Leap Forward campaign came to an
end in 1960. The death toll was 45 million.
Zhu (2012) writes that the Chinese government continued it unbalanced growth strategy
with minimal adjustments. Mao wanted to compete with industrial nations and hoped to do so
my collectivizing agriculture and greater industrialization. Resource allocation was centralized
under the Communist party, most projects were undertaken with little input from experts, and
served as an experiment to introduce new agricultural techniques. The economic implication of
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this campaign was a great shortage of food supply and a subsequent decline in population. The
allocation of resources to the manufacturing sector also didn’t have the intended return, increase
the urban population and further strained the food supply. After the failure of the great leap
forward, Mao saw that social goals weren’t completely consistent with rapid growth in the short
run thus changing his priority to social goals.
The Cultural Revolution of 1966 was another campaign initiated by Mao which had a
greater sociopolitical implication on China than it did on the economy. However, it is important
to note that Mao was able to revolutionize a great mass of young people to believe that he was a
great communist leader and that centralized governance was the path for China’s future success.
Many youths protested and stopped going to schools and colleges. The protests led to the
decrease in factory production, railroads were chaotic and food supplies decreased. All in all,
economic activity slowed down to a certain extent and China really was not in a position to bear
a decline in production.
Paus et. al. (2009) write that the economic experiments led by Mao skipped stages of
production hoping to propel China ahead of capitalist western countries. Mao wanted to achieve
national and regional self-sufficiency which critiqued the notion of comparative advantage. He
aimed to build a comprehensive and independent industrial system which led to inefficiency. Zhu
(2012) writes that after the Great leap forward the household registration system, hukou system
was implemented to prevent farmers from leaving rural regions. This enabled the government to
extract agricultural surplus which helped capital accumulation in the industrial sector, however,
it reduced the productivity of farmers. The capital to output ratio grew by 140 percent between
1952 to 1978. Average years of education also increased significantly between those years. Zhu
(2012) writes that despite the decrease in productivity the capital accumulation and education
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helped increase China’s GDP per capita. However, he further writes that the industrial policy
pursued by the Chinese government between 1952-1978 created a misallocation of resources that
declined productivity, minimal improvements in living standards, and decreased productivity
overall.

b. Deng Xiaoping’s Economic Reforms and Post-Mao China
After Mao’s death in 1976, there was an opportunity for change. Under Mao the
economic structure was centralized and the government allocated most of the resources. The
economy was inefficient leading to a low growth rate, minimal consumption and technological
progress. Soon Mao’s goals of self-reliance were replaced by an open-door policy. Perkin (1989)
writes that Chinese leadership began to alter the system that had evolved over the previous two
decades. As the changes were implemented to the system, economic growth accelerated to an
average of 8% a year, between 1977 and 1985. Zhu (2012) writes that economic reforms and
institutional changes which increased productivity growth in China have taken place in
experimental and decentralized method. The ultimate source of this rise in productivity was the
change in political leadership at the top.
Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the one child policy was implemented to control
the population growth and avoid starvation. Deng Xiaoping’s reforms built on the four
modernizations: agriculture, industry, technology and defense. In 1981, Deng decollectivized
agriculture and farmers were also given individual control over land. They were now able to
control the profit of their output. This increased China’s agricultural productivity. There was a
relaxation of constraints on the state owned as well as collectively owned enterprises. Deng’s
policy relied on material incentives and lower price control. Town and village enterprises in the
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country side enabled China to produce labor intensive goods and provided employment to the
rural population, helping bridge some of the rural urban gap. They specialized in the production
of textile, furniture and metal processing (Magnus, 2018). Capital allocation for enterprises also
shifted from centrally allocated to banks, bonds and other financial instruments (Delisle and
Goldstein, 2019).
Zhu (2012) writes that total factor productivity grew rapidly in the agricultural and nonstate sector. The average growth rate between 1979 to 2007 was 4.031 and 3.91 in both the
sectors respectively. The average rate of the state sector remained significantly low until 1998,
after which the state sector grew at an average rate of 5.5 percent. He writes that 15th congress of
the Chinese Communist Party in 1997 was a milestone for Chinese economic policies. Private
enterprises were legalized and sanctions for the reform of state enterprises were introduced. This
led to an increase in private enterprises. Most importantly the self-imposed isolation of China
changed and shifted towards a greater role of foreign engagement to increase China’s
modernization. Numerous enterprises were granted the right to engage in international trade. In
an attempt to join the WTO, China started to lower its trade barriers, broaden trade rights, and
liberalize Foreign Direct Investment infrastructure. Four special economic zones were created in
the southeast part of China in the initial years of economic reform, which served as a host for
foreign investment. As investment increased the special economic zones were extended to more
coastal cities. Wider sectors of the Chinese economy were opened to foreign investment. Delisle
and Goldstein (2019) write that this gradual opening up to foreign investments reflects an early
recognition of the benefits of foreign direct investment to China. They also realize the usefulness
of international competition in catalyzing change. Zhu (2012) further finds that trade
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liberalization and privatization increased competition in the manufacturing industry which led to
higher productivity while the state sector which was exposed to little

c. Belts and Roads Initiatives & Made in China 2025
Looking at more recent economic initiatives by the Chinese government, two
monumental initiatives are the Belts and Road initiative and the Made in China 2025 plan. In
2013, President Xi Jinping announced the Belts and Roads initiative during his visit to
Kazakhstan. The infrastructure investment plan aims to create a network of railways, energy
pipelines and highways that connect Asia, Africa and Latin America. During the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Indonesia the same year, President Xi Jinping announced
his plans for a 21st century Maritime Silk Road, which aims to invest in port development in the
Indian ocean to connect Southeast Asia to East Africa and Europe, to accommodate the increase
in trade volume.
From an economic standpoint BRI provides China with new investment opportunities and
an export market. Domestically, Kong et. al. (2021) find that the BRI has significantly increased
the economic development of Chinese cities along the BRI route. They measure use TFP of a
city as the proxy for the economic development of a city and BRI has improved the quality of
economic growth in Chinese cities on the routes, compared to those that aren’t on the route, by
0.191 units. They further find that the BRI has increased the Real GDP of Chine by 0.867 units
and foreign investment by 0.82 units. Their paper specifically investigates the impact of the BRI
on technological innovation, industrial structure upgrading, and resource allocation on the
quality of economic growth of cities in China along the BRI route. Their findings indicate that
BRI has promoted technological innovation and improved the quality of economic growth.
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Similarly, they find that BRI has promoted the upgrading of industrial structure contributing to
the overall increase in TFP of the city. They also find that BRI has improved the resource
allocation efficiency of the cities on its route which has had a positive impact on TFP. They
conclude that the BRI helps optimize and upgrade industrial infrastructure, improve urban
resource allocation efficiency, and is the most effective way to achieve sustainable development.
Liu and Xin (2019) write that the Ministry of Environmental Protection has emphasized
the need for sustainable development as China shifts from an input driven economy to an output
driven economy. They look at the impact of BRI on green total factor productivity (GTFP),
which takes into consideration resource and environmental constraints on TFP in addition to the
input constraints. They find that BRI construction has promoted GTFP in both the Silk Road
Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road regions and some provinces in China. However, they
do find a negative relationship between provincial level economic development and GTFP. They
note that this is in line with the environmental Kuznets curve where in pollution increases along
with economic development, before reaching a point, inflection point, where the pollution slows
down as economic growth continues to increase. They noted that a lot of the provinces had still
not reached the inflection point. They believe that this is because R&D and economic
development in these provinces haven’t reached a point where foreign trade has clear positive
impacts on GTFP.
The Chinese government has also launched the Made in China 2025 initiative, which
aims to make China a dominant manufacturer of the high-tech goods and services. They aim to
reduce China’s dependence on foreign technology. Recently the Chinese economy has started
shifting away from the low value added and low wage manufacturing primarily to escape the
middle-income trap. The middle-income trap is a phenomenon characterized by a slow-down in
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economic growth due to the diminishing return of the factor which led to its growth. Therefore,
new sources of growth and productivity are required to escape the trap. McBride (2019) writes
that currently China faces an unbalance economy with a low domestic consumption rate and high
savings rate. By upgrading their manufacturing technology, China hopes to more up the value
chain. The first step of the process, Made in China 2025, comprise of overall improvement of the
quality of manufacturing, boosting innovation, and productivity. By 2025, China aims to boost
competitiveness and improve innovation capabilities. Finally, on the 100th anniversary of the
founding of the People’s Republic of China, in 2049, it aims to have the capabilities to lead
innovation and have a comparative advantage in major manufacturing areas.
Morrison (2019) writes that the implementation of the Made in China 2025 initiative
signals an expanded role of the government in the economy, which can cause distortions in the
global market. The Chinese government will provide financial assistance to Chinese firms
especially state-owned enterprises. The government encourages Chinese companies to invest in
foreign companies in the high-tech sector to gain access to technology while foreign firms that
want to invest in China are compelled to form joint ventures with Chinese firms requiring them
to share sensitive intellectual property and technological knowledge with the Chinese firm.
Ramadori (2021) writes the after extensive backlash Chinese policy makers have eradicated
provisions to better enable foreign investments and strengthen the protection of intellectual
property rights. The end goal of the Made in China 2025 initiative is to create a self-sufficient
high-tech industry and insulate itself from punitive trade sanctions from countries like the US.
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Conclusion
Throughout Chinese history we see that the Chinese Communist Party has had a great
control over the allocation of resources which in turn has substantially changed the productivity
of the Chinese economy. Especially the reform implemented by Deng Xiaoping helped China
achieve high economic growth and make its mark in the global economy. The current initiative
like the BRI and Made in China 2025 initiative demonstrate the Chinese government’s control
over the economy and creating government policies that will continue to affect the Chinese
economy’s productivity and growth. The impact of the BRI has been extensively researched for
its impact on the countries that will be along the route, Kong et. al. (2021) and Liu and Xin
(2019) look at its impact on Chinese cities. They find that resource allocation and TFP are
positively affected in cities along the route of the BRI. As for the Made in China 2025 initiative,
some policies have raised concerns about intellectual property theft among countries like the US.
Successful implementation of these policies will enable China to move up the supply chain and
increase efficiency, which is essential for per capita income growth.

13

CHAPTER THREE
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In this chapter I analyze and present literature on China’s economic growth. The chapter
is divided into three sections. Section A highlight the various factor that literature suggests is the
key to China’s economic. Section B compares China’s economic growth model to the growth
model followed by its East Asian neighbors. Section C summarizes more recent news pertaining
to the factors highlighted in section A to better understand China’s economic growth in the
future. Section A helps understand China’s impressive economic growth, section B and section C
build on previous literature to analyze what course China’s growth trend may take in the future.

a. Factors Affecting China’s Economic Growth
Awan (2013) analyzes the role of R&D expenditure, savings and investment in GDP
growth. The main question he seeks to answer is whether it is possible for an economy to sustain
positive growth through investments in capital stock and savings. Using a Vector Autoregression
model to capture the relationship between labor productivity, export, investment and R&D, he
finds that in the long run exports and capital accumulation contribute to productivity. R&D
expenditure affects investment and indirectly affects productivity through investment, showing a
positive effect in both long and short run. He finds that export has a greater effect on productivity
than investment. More efficient allocation of resources and greater competitiveness in the
international market, increases spillover from technology transfer. The reallocation of investment
from traditional to more dynamic sectors due to fiscal incentives given by the Chinese
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government, is also an important factor in aiding the spectacular growth of China. He observes
that investment is growing faster than export since the late 1960.
Cao and Jariyapan (2012) investigate the relationship between FDI and economic growth
and also the relationship between economic growth and the interaction of FDI with two types of
human capital, knowledgeable human capital and technical human capital. They define
knowledgeable human capital, the share of enrollment of university and college students over the
total employment. Technical human capital is defined as the share of enrollment of specialized
secondary school (including vocational school and technical school) students over total
employment. They find that between the period of 1995 and 2009, FDI positively affects the
economic growth but is statistically insignificant. The interaction term between FDI and
knowledgeable human capital has a greater positive impact on economic growth and is
statistically significant. A one percent increase in FDI together with knowledgeable human
capital increases GDP by 0.45%. They also find that knowledgeable human capital is more
efficient than technical human capital. Their findings are contrary to beliefs that FDI in China
has always been beneficial. They argue that the complementary effect of FDI and knowledgeable
human capital increase the growth of a host economy. They also find that the interaction term
between FDI and technical human capital has a negative effect on the GDP, but attribute it to the
lack of data. They conclude that FDI contributes to economic growth only when absorptive
capability of advanced technologies is available in the host economy. In the case of China,
higher academic education is needed compared to secondary technical education.
Yao and Zang (2003) write that the devaluation of the RMB and FDI have played an
important role in creating a solid foundation for China’s export growth. In the external
environment the exchange rate, FDI and export all together have created a favorable environment
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for economic growth. Reforms in the exchange rate market promoted exports and FDI. In the
internal environment human capital played a greater role in increasing economic growth than
transportation and location (province).
As Cao and Jariyapan (2012) highlight the importance of human capital in addition to
FDI as key to China’s economic growth, Bailliu et. al. (2019) predict that between 2010-2030 the
working age population will shrink by 7%, people between the age of 15-29 will make up only
30% of the working population. They estimate the trends of China’s economic growth so far
using the Cobb-Douglas production function. In order to predict human capital development,
they carry forward the observed educational characteristics of the 2010 cohort. They predict that
secondary enrollment increases by 9% while tertiary employment increases by 20%, thus
average years of education will increase in the future. R&D spending’s contribution to total
factor productivity is significant, they predict that the real FDI stock will grow at 5% in the
future. They conclude that factor productivity will be the driving force of Chinese economic
growth. Implementation of government reform to enhance productivity will have a positive
impact on TFP growth.
Liu and Wang (2003) analyze the relationship between TFP and FDI and whether TFP
plays a role in attracting FDI in a particular sector. They find that FDI in a certain sector is
affected by the level of export, market size, and skill intensity, further writing that there is no
two-way link between FDI and total factor productivity. They find a positive relationship
between FDI and total factor productivity. Since technological progress is an important
determinant of total factor productivity growth in the long run, they conclude that technological
progress has a positive relationship with FDI. Like Cao and Jariyapan (2012) they find that the
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interaction between human capital and R&D, which serves as a proxy for innovation, has a
positive and significant effect on total factor productivity.
Similarly, Zeng et. al. (2009) observe that in the future, China has to rely more on total
factor productivity than capital deepening. They analyze the effect of factor accumulation, factor
allocation and total factor productivity growth to understand the growth of China. Subsidies on
land, electricity, and other utilities like water and availability of cheap loans for state owned
enterprises have enabled high growth of investments. China’s investment strategy therefore has
three major side effects. It has enabled a buildup of excess capacity, which has led to greater
exports, which has increased China’s foreign reserve, the increase in money surplus leads to
further investment. They further write that there are signs of too much investment in the
manufacturing for exports. Most FDI comes from firms that are small or medium sized bringing
relatively little advanced technology. Policy makers soon realized that investment alone was not
increasing productivity and that total factor productivity due to urbanization, investment in
human capital and technological innovation would help economic growth.
Prime (2012) argues that more reforms and improving technology will be vital for
China’s economic growth in the future. She highlights that after joining the WTO, the western
and central regions of China have opened to FDI. Increasing use of capital relative to labor,
expanding export, advanced technology, and greater efficiency of the economy through market
reforms has propelled China’s economic growth. However, the strongest contributor to China’s
economic growth according to Prime (2012) is savings which have enabled high levels of
investment and slow population growth. She further writes that without new resources and
technological change, China’s output may decrease overtime. It is difficult to decrease the
population growth even more because it is already low and has begun to age. Since savings are
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already quite high and overcapacity due to investment is already a problem, it is increased
consumption that can be China’s economic growth engine in the future.
Looking at demographic data, Black and Morrison (2019) too believe that China’s
slowdown is inevitable. They find that the working age population is decreasing, without a
dramatic improvement in labor productivity, this will lead to a decrease in GDP. They compare
China’s economy to that of Japan and argue that Japan had a similar decrease in labor
productivity and find it unlikely that China will succeed where Japan has failed. In addition to
labor productivity, excess supply of rural workers and access to foreign technology is
weakening. In the case of Japan, as its population growth started decreasing, domestic
consumption decreased which led to Japanese firms slipping off of the Global 500 list. A country
can increase productivity by either increasing immigration or increasing the productivity of the
given workers. Since 2006, the urban-rural migration has decreased and this is being reflected by
the increase in labor wage rates. Corporate and government debt is also on the rise. Due to the
high savings rate and current account surplus, China has been able to sustain its borrowing.
Black and Morrison (2019) predict that due to lower productivity growth the government is
likely to borrow more through state owned enterprises.

b. Is China Following the East Asian Growth Model?
Perkins (1989) writes that an increase in the inputs for production like capital and labor
or an increase in the productivity of these inputs are essential to economic growth. In South
Korea and Taiwan capital stock grew at a higher rate than national products, labor force growth
however wasn’t as significantly high. Labor force and increase in capital stock only accounted
for half of the national product growth rates from 1950s to 1970s. The other half was accounted

18

for by the increase in productivity. He writes that Africa, in the 1970s and early 1980s, too
experienced a substantial capital formation and had a greater labor force growth than East Asian
countries, however, the national product growth rate averaged at 3 percent while the growth rate
in East Asia was 9 to 10 percent. This was because there was no increase in productivity, and in
fact much of the region experienced a decrease in productivity. He further writes that growth rate
in China between the years 1977 to 1985 averaged at 8 percent and that productivity growth
accounted for most of the growth. As China has a greater size than its East Asian neighbors,
China’s future will depend on whether it moves away from central planning. He predicts that if
China comes up with an efficient urban economic system and if the international market is
willing to accommodate increasing Chinese exports; China can achieve similar growth as that of
its East Asian neighbors.
Boltho and Weber (2009) write that while there isn’t an agreed definition of what the
East Asian Development model means, for the purposes of their study they describe it as a
development model consisting of a rapid growth in investment, manufacturing sector, external
competitiveness, protection of domestic firms from international competition, fairly authoritarian
government, and a homogenous population. In their paper they are specifically looking at the
growth of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. This definition suits my thesis as well, therefore,
moving forward the Asian Development characteristic will refer to those mentioned above. They
observe that the growth rate of China is identical to that of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and
the total factor productivity rates are also very similar. Rapid growth in these economies was
made possible because of high savings, investment rate and external competitiveness. Investment
effort in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan was mostly in the private sector, while in the case of
China most investment has taken place in state owned enterprises. The private sector has had a
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difficult time getting funds. China’s export trend has also been very similar to its East Asian
neighbors. Despite China’s relative poverty it has a higher level of human capital formation,
compared to Japan, and that investment in human growth was substantial before economic
growth.
Overholt (2018) highlights that the China Model, like the Asian Model, is gradually
opening its national market, removing state-imposed pricing of goods and services, and
developing regulatory infrastructure that enable the market to function smoothly. It is doing so
gradually instead of a shock therapy, which didn’t go well for the Soviet Union. China has
broken up most of its monopolies in the 1990s, to achieve efficiency through competition. He
further argues that competition has enabled efficiency leading to the creation of companies like
Lenovo; instead of having firms inefficient companies pampered by the state. Overholt (2018)
writes that the extent of Chinese leaders’ acceptance of competitive success remains to be seen.
He notes that Prime Minister Xi Jinping’s decisions seem to be encouraging inefficient stateowned enterprises (SOE).
Zheng et. al. (2013) write that a major characteristic of China’s economic development is
that it has become a major economy without having a large group of internationally competitive
firms. The Chinese economy has been heavily reliant on the import of foreign manufacturing
technology. Such was not the case for countries like Japan and Korea. Industrial policy, which
selected certain industries over others for fixed and technological investment to increase
economies of scale, was crucial for the development of Japan and Korea. Each economy had a
conglomerate of private firms, which benefited from shared R&D and government subsidies on
input, called Keiretsu and Chaebol. Boltho and Weber (2009) highlight that China’s economic
growth lacks such a conglomerate. China’s industrial policy focused more on State owned
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enterprises instead of private companies. Another major difference between China and the three
countries in their study is that China has been more open to FDI. The authors write that this is
because China was preparing for its accession in the WTO which required it to forgo
protectionist behavior. Japan and Korea over the years aimed to move away from an export
basket with light manufacturing to heavy manufacturing while China did the opposite. They also
note that in China an interesting difference can also be observed between China and its East
Asian neighbors, income distribution. Even though China is socialist there is an emerging urban
rural gap unlike that in Japan, Korea or Taiwan. This is reflective of Deng Xiaoping’s famous
phrase “Let some get rich first” which was his pitch to the Chinese population to popularize his
economic reforms. Special Economic Zones were created along the coastal regions, which led to
the prosperity of the people who lived in those regions while those in the central and western
region didn’t gain from the economic reforms.
Prime (2012) also writes that the urban rural divide ensures an endless supply of cheap
labor which has helped export oriented industry to keep costs low. The hukou system is a
household registration system that limits the permanent migration of the rural population to the
urban regions. Therefore, most rural workers travel for work temporarily and are referred to as
the “floating population”. This system along with a preference for the east coast, which has
historically had better capital, infrastructure, and educated labor force, has sustained the urban
rural divide in China and has led to an increase in the income inequality in China. This prompted
the Chinese government in 2000 to begin a program called “Develop the West” to invest more
government funding into infrastructure, education and health in the western provinces to address
geographical inequality.
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Jia and Chao (2016) compare the growth strategy of China and the growth strategy of the
Four Asian Tigers. Several major features, including high investment rates, rapid trade-opening,
strong export orientations (with an undervalued currency), active government interventions and
macroeconomic management, have arguably been critical for the growth experience of these
economies. Many economists are worried that the Chinese mainland would follow the Four
Tigers’ growth path and that its growth might suddenly end. The authors found that the four
Asian tigers relied more on physical capital accumulation. Government intervention as a share of
GDP encouraged GDP growth in Taiwan and Mainland China but had a hindering effect on the
other economies. Significant reform efforts should be made to reduce the heavy dependence on
the high investment rate and export by encouraging greater consumption.
Krugman (1994) writes about growth accounting and the importance of an improvement
in efficiency in sustaining economic growth rates. He highlights that the economic growth of the
Soviet Union, after the end of World War 2, can be fully explained by the increase in input like
expansion of employment, increase in education level, and considerable investment in physical
capital. Therefore, Soviet Union’s growth was not as mysterious or shocking as the west had
perceived it to be. He argues that economic growth based on the expansion of input instead of a
growth of output per unit of input is subject to diminishing returns, therefore, a slowdown of the
economic growth is inevitable. He further wrote that the future prospects of the rapid growth of
Asian economies is also limited, and so it was. The only secret to Asian economies growth
according to Krugman is their willingness to sacrifice current satisfaction for future gains.
More recently Overholt (2018) also highlights the same issue with China’s economic growth
as Krugman (1994) did with the growth of Soviet Union and Asian economies like Japan.
Overholt (2018) notes that China’s net export growth is declining as China’s wage rate has
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increased and manufacturing is cheaper in countries like Vietnam, Bangladesh and other African
countries. The efficiency of infrastructure investment has declined to a great extent that it might
become negligible. Boosting domestic consumption is the solution to China’s economic growth
problem. Since it is difficult to increase consumption through just subsidies on goods and
services, the government is focusing on supply side reforms like facilitating urbanization,
reducing red tape and encouraging entrepreneurship and innovation.

c. Recent News on Productivity, FDI, and Government Initiatives and Reforms
In the last quarter China’s economic growth was 4.9%. Many economists believe that this
is due to the lagged effect of 2020, they question whether China needs to rethink its policies for
the rest of 2021. Xie (2021) writes that China long-term aims to regulate the real estate industry,
internet companies and private tutoring as officials blame high housing and education cost as a
burden to the middle class, discouraging many to have children.
The Chinese government claims that the economy is facing three-fold pressure –
contraction of demand, supply shock and weakening expectation. Retail sales growth and
consumption’s contribution to China’s GDP has slowed down while COVID 19 continues to
disrupt the production and labor market (Sun 2021). Tang and Wang (2022) write that a decrease
in the birthrate adds to the problem. In 2021 the births dropped to 10.6 million from 12 million in
2020, causing the birth rate to be at a record low of 7.52 births for every 1,000 people. With the
natural growth of the population at 0.34 the speed of population ageing is faster than expected.
Wang and Sun (2021) note that the job losses due to the pandemic has decreased household
income, which has further lowered people’s willingness to have more children. However, a
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number of initiatives have been taken on the provincial and municipal level by giving parents
financial support and time off for having a second or a third child.
Goldman (2021) writes that despite the crackdown on real estate, which accounts for a
fourth of the GDP, China continues to grow because consumption has stayed on track and strong
net exports. However, Lee and Tang (2021) write that Fitch and Morgan Stanley predict that
China’s economic growth is likely to deteriorate in 2022. They highlight three main reasons: the
COVID-19 delta variant, upcoming leadership reshuffle, and rising debt levels. Due to China’s
zero tolerance policy, some cities in China are still under a lockdown due to the delta variant.
The deleveraging of property developers, according to Fitch ratings, will decrease China’s
economic growth rate. Morgan Stanley believes that China may pause to balance growth and
debt management. The chief China economist at Morgan Stanley predicts some tax-cuts and
consumption subsidies are necessary to keep up the economic growth. Wei (2021) further writes
that China’s aim to reduce carbon dioxide emission by 2030 has led to a decrease in the
generation of electricity from coal powered plants, the power outage has affected production in
many factories. He further writes that the goals of the policies are reasonable but the
implementation is generating greater economic loss.
For the first time China has decided not to set a target labor productivity and economic
growth rate. China’s productivity is expected to slow-down as its labor force is expected to
shrink. However, Beijing aims to increase the average number of years spent in school,
particularly in rural regions to have a more skilled and educated labor force. As of 2016 only half
of the youth in rural regions attend high school, most rural youth chose to follow their parents’
footstep and find work in the city. Leng and Lee (2021) write that as the hukou system is relaxed
in cities with lower population density, a greater rural population may be able to access better
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healthcare and education. Another major challenge for China to avoid the middle-income trap is
also to have 60% of its labor force that has graduated high school. As of 2015 only 30% of
China’s labor force had graduated high school or higher.
Siqi (2021) reports that especially after the pandemic, more recent college graduates are
applying to government jobs instead of the private sector, which is contrary to the sentiments of
the previous generation. Due to the pandemic uncertainty in the private sector has increased. The
Chinese youth is concerned about the high living cost, work pressure of the private sector opting
for a more certain government job with steadier income and benefits. Last year 1.576 million
applicants applied for a total of 25,726 positions.
In most developed countries, consumption as a share of GDP is about 70-80%. In the
case of China, the consumption as a share of GDP is around 55%. Ip (2021) writes that the first
three quarters of 2021, consumer spending contributed 64.8% of GDP. Boosting consumption
spending is the economic priority for the top leadership. The upper middle income is expected
grow by 68% between 2020 to 2030. Chinese consumers are being encourage to spend more by
increasing discounts and deals on e-commerce platforms, minimum wages on the provincial
level is regularly adjusted for inflation and living cost. Ip (2021) further writes that reliance of
export-oriented strategy is unsustainable especially amidst deteriorating relations with trade
partners. Therefore, China’s leaders are implementing a more inward-looking strategy to drive
economic growth. Zipser et. al (2021) finds that consumers in the upper middle-income bracket
are going to drive consumption growth in China. By 2030 they estimate that the middle and
upper middle-income consumers’ contribution will increase to 60% of urban consumption from
35% as of 2021.

25

Conclusion
A review of relevant literature indicates that FD, TFP, human capital, increase in export,
and government interventions to enhance factor allocation have played an important role in
increasing the GDP growth of China. Joining the WTO gave China an incentive to open up its
economy and decrease barriers to entry. The Chinese economy emphasized investment in human
capital and innovation to help economic growth. Scholars predict that factor productivity will be
the driving force of Chinese economic growth. Implementation of government reform to enhance
productivity will have a positive impact on TFP growth which will increase economic growth.
While the Chinese development model is different from the Asian development model,
there are some similarities like the emphasis on export-oriented growth, growth in investment,
and opening up of its economy to foreign competition. However, the Chinese economy is mostly
powered by state owned enterprises while countries like Japan and South Korea had business
conglomerates that undertook major productions and R&D. Many economists warn that China
may follow the Four Tigers’ growth path and soon experience a decrease in growth rate.
Krugman (1994) compared the Soviet Union’s growth with that of the Four Asian Tigers and
found that these economies were able to grow at high rates only because there was an increase in
inputs thus diminishing return led to a slowdown of these economies. In order to keep a modest
economic growth rate China needs to focus more on factors that increase the output per input to
increase efficiency.
In the previous chapter, I highlighted government initiatives like BRI and Made in China
2025. The Made in China 2025 initiative hopes to increase high tech manufacturing in China and
move up in the supply chain. Having a high-tech manufacturing infrastructure will increase
value-added and thus, increase the productivity of its inputs which can subsequently increase the
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efficiency of the economy. Recent news about the Chinese economy shows an emphasis on
rebalancing the economy to achieve sustainable growth. Escaping the middle-income trap and
increasing domestic consumption remains the top priority of government policies. With an
increase in crackdown on private enterprises, many young college graduates are applying for
government jobs instead of private sector jobs. This may accelerate the economic slowdown as
its labor force is also expected to shrink.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter presents the analytical framework and the model that will be used to
estimate the effect of TFP and FDI on the GDP of China. In the Section A, I describe the three
models I will be using to understand the relationship between the independent and dependent
variables. In Section B, I will present the data that I use for my empirical analysis and the
summary statistics. I will also highlight the trend of TFP and FDI in China to better understand
its effect on the GDP.
a. Model
The literature reviewed in the previous section emphasizes the contribution of Foreign
Direct Investment and Total Factor Productivity to the economic growth of China. Cao and
Jariyapan (2012), Yao and Zang (2003), and Liu and Wang (2003) highlight the role of FDI in
China’s economic growth. While Cao and Jariyapan (2012) dig deeper and interact FDI with
knowledgeable human capital to investigate the effect of FDI on China’s economic growth, Yao
and Zang (2003) find that FDI and exports together promote economic growth. Liu and Wang
(2003) investigate the relationship between FDI and TFP believing that FDI will be greater in a
sector with a higher TFP. However, there is no two-way link between FDI and TFP, and that the
positive relationship between FDI and TFP is due to technological progress. Bailliu et. al. (2019)
decompose China’s economic growth trend into capital stock, TFP, labor and human capital.
They predict that over the next 15 years capital accumulation will slow down and while TFP
growth will continue to grow, therefore, TFP will be an important determinant of China’s
economic growth. Economic reforms to rebalance China’s economy also focus on promoting
TFP. Therefore, TFP and FDI are included in my model and are the variables of interest.
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Looking at the Asian Development model, literature review suggests that opening up to
trade played a major role in the economic growth. Boltho and Weber (2009) and Zheng et. al.
(2013) write that external competition and rapid growth in investment has helped East Asian
countries increase economic growth and can be seen doing the same for China. Therefore, I
include a proxy variable for economic openness, called Openness.
Contribution of FDI to economic growth is dependent on the host country’s ability to
absorb advanced technology. The ability to absorb advanced technology refers to the
infrastructure of host countries but also the literacy of its population. In order to account for this,
I include Human Capital Index in my model. Human Capital Index quantifies the contribution of
education and healthcare in increasing the productivity of workers, therefore making it a key
indicator for sustainable development. To further analyze the effect of FDI, I include the capital
stock to labor ratio. Alam et. al (2013) write that FDI is bound to impact the labor productivity of
the host economy due to technological transfer and managerial knowledge transfer to local firms.
Literature review suggests that FDI is important for China’s economic growth, I wanted to
understand how impactful technological transfer has been for labor productivity therefore, I
create a proxy variable to calculate this by dividing the capital stock by total labor force. This
variable will shed light on how technology is affecting labor productivity.
Prime (2012) writes that China’s household registration system, hukou, has been
advantageous to China as it has created an endless supply of low-cost labor for jobs in the
export-oriented industry, decreased cost of construction and kept wage rates low. Therefore, I
include labor participation rate in my model to account for the supply of labor in China, which is
one of the most populous countries in the world. Prime (2012) further writes that China joining
the World Trade Organization enabled the opening of the its central and western region to
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foreign investment. To understand the effect of China’s accession into the WTO, I create a
dummy variable that has the value 0 prior to 2001 and takes the value 1 post 2001.

My empirical model is as follows:

Real GDP = β0+ β1 FDI + β2 TFP + β3 Openness + β4 Human Capital Index + β5 Inflation +
β6Labor Force Participation + β7 Capital stock to labor ratio + b8 WTO + Ɛ

(1)

Equation (1) estimates the relationship between Real GDP and the variables of interest
FDI and TFP. In order to better understand the relationship between Real GDP and the variables
of interest, I run a regression with the log of each variable. Doing so helps linearize the variable
thus, we are able to see a liner relationship between non-linear variables. Equation (2) estimates
the relationship between the log of Real GDP and log of FDI and log of TFP. The variable WTO
is not logged as it is a dummy variable.

Log Real GDP = β0+ β1 log (FDI) + β2 log (TFP) + β3 log (Openness) + β4 log (Human Capital
Index) + β5 log (Inflation) + β6 log (Labor Force Participation) +
β7 log (Capital stock to labor ratio) + b8 WTO + Ɛ

(2)

In equation (3) I look at the first difference of the log of each variable. The log of each
variable is lagged by a year and the difference between the two years is estimated. This helps
check for stationarity in the data. Lack of stationarity indicates that the trend has predictable
patterns in the future.
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D Log Real GDP = β0+ β1 D log (FDI) + β2 D log (TFP) + β3 D log (Openness) + β4 D log (Human
Capital Index) + β5 D log (Inflation) + β6 D log (Labor participation) +
β7 D log (Capital stock to labor ratio) + b8 WTO + Ɛ

(3)

b. Data Description
This study uses data from 3 main sources World Bank DataBank, Federal Reserve
Economic Data, and the Penn World Table (Version 10). The frequency of the data that I use for
this research is annual. The data ranges from the years 1990 to 2019.
The Total Factor Productivity (TFP), at current purchasing power parities, the data comes
from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. They measure the total factor productivity level at Current Purchasing Power Parity by
dividing the change in real GDP between year t and year t-1 which is then divide by quantity
index of factor inputs. The data ranges from the years 1956 to 2019.
In Figure 1, to better highlight the impact of Total Factor Productivity on the economic
development of China, I look at the TFP at Constant National Prices for China indexed the year
1980 to be the base year. This data is only used for figure 1 to highlight the effect of TFP in the
Chinese economy. I use constant purchasing power parity for the data in the regression analysis
with USA indexed 1. In late 1978, under Deng Xiaoping, China opened up its economy to the
West. The effects of the economic opening are lagged therefore I chose 1980 as the base year.
Figure 1 shows the trend in TFP. The orange line indicates the base year 1980. Looking at the
graph post 1980, we can see a significant increase in TFP. Between the years 1999 to 2010, we
see a steep increase in TFP. This is of great interest as this increase could be due to China’s
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accession into the World Trade organization in 2001, and its steps taken in preparation for its
accession in the years before 2001. Furthermore, in Figure 1 we can see that there has been a
steady decline in TFP since 2014, and seems to have plateaued after 2018. This helps addresses
the second part of my thesis question, whether the factors that have contributed to China’s
economic growth will continue to sustain China’s growth trend in the future. A scatterplot of the
relationship between TFP Current Purchasing Power Parities and China’s Real GDP between the
years 1990 to 2019 in the Appendix shows a positive relationship between the two variables.
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Figure 1: Total Factor Productivity at Constant National Prices for China, Index 1980=100,
Annual, not seasonally adjusted.
The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) data comes from the World Bank, for the purposes
of this paper I use FDI net inflow BoP in current USD. FDI is calculated as the sum of equity
capital, reinvestment of earning, and other capital. FDI net inflow indicates the investments made
by non-resident investors in China. According to literature review FDI has been crucial to
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China’s economic growth by enabling better access to technology which in turn makes
production more efficient. Figure 2 shows the FDI inflow trend from the years 1979 to 2019. We
can see that after 2004 there has been a significant increase in FDI flow to China. There is a
steep drop in 2008 to 2009 reflecting the impact of the Great Recession, followed by a steeper
increase in FDI inflow since 2010. From the year 2008 to 2019 we can see that FDI inflow has
become more volatile than in the years prior to 2008. From 2013 to 2017 there was a consistent
decline in FDI inflow, Morrison (2017) notes that between January 2013 to December 2016
China’s FDI recorded a year on year downward trend. In 2016 it experienced an all-time low for
both job and project creation. China global rank for FDI also dropped down to the fourth position
from the second position in 2013. In 2017, the Chinese government announced plans to decrease
restrictions on foreign firms to operate in China. A scatterplot of the relationship between FDI
Net Inflow and China’s Real GDP between the years 1990 to 2019 in the Appendix shows a
strong positive relationship between the two variables.
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Figure 2: Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflow Current US$
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In order to calculate the openness of the Chinese economy I add the export in goods and
services volume and the import in goods and services volume and divide that by the real GDP.
The variable is a proxy variable to measure the openness of the Chinese economy. This data
comes from the World Bank DataBank. In Figure 3, we can see that there is a steep rise in
China’s openness after the year 2002. This is expected and in agreement with literature reviewed
as China decreased its trade barrier and shifted towards an export led economic growth strategy.
In the figure we also see a slight decrease in the latter half of 2018 and continuing on to 2019.
This is reflective of the trade war between USA and China under the Trump administration. The
trade war started January of 2018, when the Trump administration announced tariffs on solar
panels, throughout the year many other trade sanctions were implemented to decrease the trade
deficit with China. China also retaliated by levying tariff on US goods and services. An
approximate $350 billion worth of exports from China was targeted while China levied tariffs on
approximately $100 billion worth of imports from the US. Thus, we can see the effect only show
later in 2018 and a sharp downward decline in 2019. The graph also shows a leftward skew.
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Figure 3: Total export and Import of good and services over the Real GDP
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I calculate the capital stock to labor ratio using the capital stock at constant national
prices and the total labor force. The capital stock at constant national prices data for China comes
from FRED St. Louis and is calculated in millions of 2017 US dollar. The labor force data comes
from the World Bank DataBank. In order to calculate the ratio, I divide the capital stock by the
labor force. The human capital index data is from the Penn World Table. I get the inflation data
for China from FRED St. Louis.

Variable

Mean

Median

Max

Min

Standard
Deviation

Inter Quartile Number of
Range
Observations

GDP growth

9.341168 9.249783

14.23086

3.920251

2.515807

2.97422

30

Real GDP

1.03E+07 8622787

2.06E+07

3165272

5885985

1.01E+07

30

FDI net inflows 1.19E+11 8.61E+10 2.91E+11

3.49E+09

9.41E+10

1.46E+11

30

0.0328492

0.0606859

30

9.75E+11

1.99E+12

30

8.89E+11

1.80E+12

30

27672.67

88961.61

172431.7

30

1.956077

0.2084005

0.3037882

30

68.24

3.818165

7.53

30

6.42E+08

4.70E+07

6.97E+07

30

-1.401473

5.538346

3.379744

30

2.90E+07

4.18E+07

30

0.0361583

0.0521236

30

TFP Current
0.386004 0.3885823 0.4318668 0.3239195
PPP
Export of goods
1.06E+12 6.90E+11 2.66E+12 4.91E+10
and services
Import of goods
9.38E+11 6.02E+11 2.56E+12 3.85E+10
and services
Openness

147479.7 149554.7

270106.9

Human Capital
2.358772 2.387103 2.698987
Index
Labor force
Participation
74.28233 73.885
79.14
Rate
Total Labor
7.44E+08 7.61E+08 7.93E+08
Force
Inflation

4.072292 2.620287

24.25699

Capital Stock at
Constant
3.36E+07 2.21E+07 1.02E+08 5316134
National Price
Capital Stock to
0.0434753 0.0289725 0.1288021 0.0082865
labor ratio
Table 1: Data Summary Statistics
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Conclusion
In this chapter I outline the analytical framework. I have three regression equations that
will highlight the effect of FDI and TFP on China’s GDP. Looking at the trend of TFP at
Constant National Prices, I see that there is a steep upward trend from 1998 to 2011. After 2011
we can see a decrease in TFP. This is in agreement with Krugman (1994) who argues that there
is a need to increase efficiency in addition to productivity to sustain economic growth. Looking
at FDI trends we see a steep increase in net inflow starting 2009 followed by a steep decrease in
2013. In 2017 the government implemented some policies to incentivize FDI. This is reflected by
a brief increase in FDI.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS
This chapter presents the empirical result for this paper. This chapter is divided in three
section, based on the three regression equations presented in the previous chapter. The first
section presents the results for the first equation with the dependent variable Real GDP, the
second section presents the results for the second equation with the dependent variable Log Real
GDP, and the last section presents the results for the second equation with the dependent variable
first difference of Log Real GDP.

a. Regression Results
This chapter presents the results for the regression analysis of the equation specified in
the previous section. The relationship between the log of Real GDP and the variables of interest,
FDI and TFP is positive and significant. This chapter will focus on the three regression tables
with Real GDP as the dependent variable in Table 2, Log Real GDP as the dependent variable in
Table 3, and the first difference of GDP and all other variables in Table 4.

i.

Section 1: Real GDP

Table 2 below shows the effect of FDI and TFP on the Real GDP of China as specified
by equation (1). The results on column (1) indicate that a one unit increase in FDI lead to a
4.46e-05 unit increase in Real GDP of China if all else remains equal. The coefficient is positive
and statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. The coefficient on the TFP variable,
however, in table one is not statistically significant. The Durbin-Watson statistic for this column
is only 0.41, indicating that there is autocorrelation in the residuals from the regression model.
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Column (2) of Table 2 includes additional variables and control variables. Adding these
variables makes the TFP coefficient statistically significant. A one unit increase in TFP leads to a
2.542e+07 unit increase in the Real GDP of China if all else remains equal. The coefficient is
statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. The coefficient on the FDI variable in
column (2) has decreased but remains positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence
interval. The coefficient on the Human Capital Index is positive and statistically significant at the
99% confidence interval. A one unit increase in Human Capital Index leads to a 4.303e+06 unit
increase in the Real GDP of China if all else remains equal. The coefficient on the capital stock
to labor ratio is also positive and statistically significant. A one unit increase in the capital stock
to labor ration leads to 8.177e+07 unit increase in the Real GDP of China if all else remains
equal. The coefficient on Inflation is negative and statistically significant at the 95% confidence
interval. A one unit increase in inflation leads to 50,211 unit decrease in the Real GDP of China
if all else remains equal. The coefficient on the variable openness is positive but statistically
insignificant. The coefficient on the WTO variable is positive but statistically insignificant. The
R-squared value of column (2) is 0.997 indicates that the independent variables of the regression
account for a great proportion of the variance in the dependent variable, Real GDP. The DurbinWatson statistic also increases to a 1.19, however, there is still autocorrelation in the residuals
from the regression model of column (2).
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Table 2: Regression Results
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: REAL GDP AT CONSTANT NATIONAL PRICES

ii.

Section 2: Log of Real GDP

Table 3 below shows the regression result for equation (2), which has the log of Real
GDP as the dependent variable. I run three regressions with log of Real GDP as the dependent
variable. The first regression only has the variables of interest, FDI and TFP. The second
regression consists of all the other independent variables as well. For the third regression I
remove the independent variables that are insignificant to check whether it has any effect on the
significance of the coefficients on the variables of interest.
In column (1) of Table 3 shows that the coefficient on FDI is positive and statistically
significant at the 99% confidence interval. A ten percent increase in FDI leads to a 3.8 percent
increase in Real GDP of China if all else remains equal. The coefficient on the TFP variable is
also positive and statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. A ten percent increase in
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TFP leads to a 17 percent increase in the Real GDP of China if all else remains equal. The
Durbin-Watson statistic is 0.33 is indicating that there is autocorrelation in the residuals from the
regression model.
In column (2) of Table 3, all the independent variables are logged. After including all the
independent variables, the coefficient on the FDI variable decreases but remains positive and
statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. A ten percent increase in FDI leads to a
0.7 percent increase in Real GDP of China if all else remains equal. The coefficient on the TFP
also decreases in but remains positive. The statistically significant of the coefficient increases to
the 99% confidence interval. A ten percent increase in TFP leads to a 6.8 percent increase in
Real GDP of China if all else remains equal. The coefficient on the openness is positive and
statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. A ten percent increase in openness leads
to a 0.4 percent increase in Real GDP of China if all else remains equal. The coefficient on
inflation is negative and statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. A ten percent
increase in inflation leads to a 0.2 percent decrease in Real GDP of China if all else remains
equal. The coefficient on the capital stock to labor ratio is positive and statistically significant at
the 99% confidence level. A ten percent increase in capital stock to labor ratio leads to a 4.1
percent increase in Real GDP of China if all else remains equal. The coefficients on Human
Capital Index, labor participation rate, and WTO are positive but statistically insignificant. The
Durbin-Watson statistic for column (2) is 1.9, indicating that there is no autocorrelation. The Rsquared is also high, indicating great goodness of fit.
In column (3) of Table 3, I remove the variables Human Capital Index, labor
participation rate, and WTO as they were statistically insignificant in the regression results
shown in column (2). The results in column (3) show that the coefficient on FDI and TFP still
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remain statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. The coefficient on FDI marginally
decreases but the coefficient on TFP marginally increases. The coefficient on openness also
marginally increases and its statistical significance also increases to the 99% confidence interval.
The coefficient on inflation decreases but remains negative and its statistical significance also
increases to the 99% confidence interval. The coefficient on the capital stock to labor ratio also
increases marginally, remains positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence
interval. The R-squared value remains 0.99 while the Durbin-Watson statistics decreases to 1.6.

Table 3: Log Variable Regression Results
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG REAL GDP AT CONSTANT NATIONAL PRICES
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iii.

Section 3: First Difference Regression Results

The results in Table 4 are the result for equation (3) where the dependent variable is the
change in log GDP and the independent variables are also changes in log of the respective
variable. The results in column (1) show that the coefficient on the change in log of FDI and TFP
are both positive and statistically significant, FDI is significant at the 90% confidence interval
while TFP is significant at the 99% confidence interval. A ten percent change in FDI leads to a
0.2 percent change in the Real GDP of China if all else remains equal. A ten percent change in
TFP leads to a 5 percent change in the Real GDP of China if all else remains equal. The DurbinWatson statistic for column (1) is 1.2, indicating that there is autocorrelation.
In column (2), I include the first difference of all other independent variable. Doing so
makes the coefficient on FDI statistically insignificant. The coefficient on TFP remains
statistically significant but decreases in significance and magnitude. All other variables are
statistically insignificant as well. The Durbin-Watson statistic and the R-squared marginally
increase for column (2).
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Table 4: First Difference Log Variable Regression Results
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CHANGE IN LOG REAL GDP AT CONSTANT NATIONAL
PRICES

Conclusion
The results presented in this chapter indicates that the variables of interest, TFP and FDI,
have a positive and statistically significant impact on the Real GDP of China. In Table 2 we see
that Total Factor Productivity become significant when we factor in variables like Human
Capital Index, Labor Force Participation Rate, Capital Stock to Labor Ratio, Inflation, and
dummy variable WTO. This indicates that when the effect of the control variables is isolated
from the relationship between the variables of interest and the dependent variable, Real GDP of
China; we learn that the impact of TFP on the Real GDP of China is statistically significant. The
results of Table 2, especially the coefficients on the variables of interest, are in line with the
literature reviewed for this paper. The coefficients on the variable openness and dummy variable
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WTO are positive and in line with literature reviewed however are statistically insignificant. This
further emphasize the importance of FDI and TFP in playing a major role in China’s Real GDP
over openness and China’s accession into the WTO.
In Table 3, the dependent variables and the independent variables are logged. This make
the relationship between the dependent and independent variable linear. The results indicate that
the log of FDI and the log of TFP remain positive and statistically significant. After dropping the
insignificant control variables from the results in column (2), the statistical significance of all the
independent variables in column (3) is at the 99% confidence interval. Therefore, the results of
Table 3 further confirm the importance of FDI and TFP on China’s Real GDP. We see that the
openness of China’s economy has become significant in these sets of regression while the WTO
dummy variable still remains statistically insignificant. Labor force participation also remains
insignificant indicating that the increase in labor force just by itself doesn’t drive China’ Real
GDP.
In Table 4, the dependent variable is the lag of log of GDP and all the log of all
independent variables are lagged too. Given that I am dealing with a time series data, it is
important to make sure that the trends are dependent on the time at which the series is observed,
thus not stationary. A stationary time series doesn’t have predictable patterns in the long run.
When checking for stationarity in column (1) both FDI and TFP have a positive and significant
relationship. When include other dependent variables, in column (2), FDI becomes insignificant
but TFP remains significant, however, TFP also loses its significance and is only significant at
the 95% confidence level.
Overall the results indicate that TFP remains positive and statistically significant in most
regression results. This indicates TFP’s significant contribution to China’s Real GDP. FDI too
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remains significant in the first two regressions but loses significance in the first difference
analysis. As for other independent variables, labor force participation rate remains statistically
insignificant while capital to labor ratio remains significant. This indicates that an increase in
capital intensity of production has a positive and significant relationship with Real GDP. The
WTTO dummy is insignificant in all regression results, this indicates that China’s accession into
the WTO didn’t have statistically significant on the Real GDP between the years 1990 to 2019.
However, opening up of its economy has had a positive and statistically significant impact on
Real GDP, similar to its East Asian neighbors.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
a. Summary of Findings
The purpose of this paper was to understand what factors that have led to China’s
economic growth and analyze whether these factors will continue helping the Chinese
economy’s growth trend. The empirical model aimed to look at the effect of TFP and FDI on the
China’s Real GDP. The results indicate that TFP plays an important role on the Real GDP of
China. In most of the regression models TFP is positive and statistically significant. These results
are consistent with literature reviewed. FDI is positive and statistically significant in the results
for equation (1) and equation (2). This indicated that FDI positively affects Real GDP. In
equation (3) when checking for stationarity, FDI loses its significance when other factors are
included in the regression. This makes sense as we saw a lot of fluctuation in the trend for FDI
after 2008. As the dataset for this paper is limited to the years 1990-2019, the trends between this
time frame may not be reliable to predict patterns in the long run.
To get a more holistic picture, I include variable like openness, HDI, labor force
participation rate and the capital stock to labor ratio. Scholars write that the opening up to trade
was an important factor behind the economic growth of the Four Asian Tigers. As China
experiences a similar economic growth, it is important to understand the effect of openness on
China’s GDP. The results indicate that openness was only statistically significant when
linearized in the equation (2). Openness data has a leftward skew, normalizing the data make the
variable more statistically significant. Capital stock to labor ratio has a positive and statistically
significant relationship with real GDP, indicating that capital intensity has a positive effect on
GDP. Inflation has a consistent negative and statistically significant relationship. Labor force
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participation which accounts for the abundant supply of labor, has an insignificant impact on the
real GDP of China. Human Capital index remains insignificant in the last two regression results.
The dummy variable WTO also remains statistically insignificant, indicating that China’s
accession into the WTO, for my dataset hasn’t had a significant impact on China’s real GDP.

b. Limitation
A major limitation of this paper is the number of observations in the dataset I have used
for my regression analysis. My dataset only contains annual observations for the year 1990 to
2019. My data was severely limited due to the unavailability of inflation data. If inflation data
was available for a greater number of years, the results could have been more robust. I believe
that the WTO dummy variable would have been more significant. China started preparing for its
accession to the world trade organization by removing barriers to trade many years prior to 2001.
Having data from 1958, which is the earliest data available for most of my variables, would have
shown a better picture of change in China’s economy’s opening up to trade.

c. Concluding Remarks
In conclusion the results of my paper highlight the importance of FDI in increasing the
real GDP of China. By looking at all the factors highlighted by previous literature, this paper
shows that FDI has a greater magnitude of effect on China GDP. This can especially be seen in
Table 3, a 10% increase in TFP leads to a 7.7% increase in Real GDP. A 10% increase in FDI
leads to a 7.2% increase in Real GDP.
Looking at the historical background of the Chinese economy we see that the government
exercises great power over resource allocation. It is, therefore, important to consider government
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interventions to accurately predict the course of China’s economic growth. Contrary to the its
east Asian neighbors like Japan and South Korea, government intervention has actually had a
positive impact on the GDP growth of China. Recent government interventions like the Belts and
Road and Made in China 2025 initiative will have a great impact on the productivity of China.
Research shows that the Chinese cities along the BRI route have experienced an increase in their
TFP. Made in China 2025 aims to enhance China’s manufacturing infrastructure and produce
more high-tech products, this will help increase more capital inputs in the Chinese economy
compared to labor inputs, potentially increasing efficiency. Krugman (1994) writes that
increasing efficiency in addition to productivity is essential to sustaining economic growth.
Especially under President Xi Jinping’s Administration, resource allocation has been centralized.
However, China at the moment has an incentive to implement market-oriented reforms to
decrease chances of isolation from the international market. The government realizes that an
export led growth strategy, followed by the Four Asian Tigers, has diminishing return. This
paper indicated that the government’s policy initiatives and ability to increase efficiency will
prevent it from facing the same abrupt slowdown as the Four Asian Tigers.
The Chinese economy faces other obstacle than productivity at the moment. Low
domestic consumption, an aging population, and an increase in debt has highlighted a need to
rebalance China’s economic growth. The upper middle-income consumer is expected to grow
and drive consumption growth in China. Recent news from China indicates that tax reforms and
subsidies are necessary to increase consumption especially after the pandemic which has led
people to save their income more given the rise in uncertainty. Recent college graduates have
also been opting for government jobs instead of the private sector. Government initiatives to
decrease pollution has led to a decrease in the generation of electricity from coal powered plants,
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which has subsequently affected production in many factories due to the increase in power
outages. Economic policy reform at the moment is top priority for leaders as it is aiming to
escape the middle-income trap. While the Chinese government’s policies are in the right
direction there is a need for more effective implementation.
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APPENDIX

Figure 4: Scatterplot of the Relationship Between TFP Current Purchasing Power Parities and
China’s Real GDP (1990-2019)

Figure 5: Scatterplot of the Relationship Between FDI Net Inflow and China’s Real GDP (19902019)
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Figure 6: Trends in Log of TFP, Log of GDP, and Log of FDI

Variable

Real GDP

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

Total Factor Productivity (TFP)

Export

Description

Source

Real GDP at Constant National
Prices for China, Millions of
2017 U.S. Dollars, Annual, Not
Seasonally Adjusted

Federal Reserve Economic
Data, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis

Foreign direct investment, net
inflows (BoP, current US$)

International Monetary Fund,
Balance of Payments database,
supplemented by data from the
United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development and
official national sources.

Total Factor Productivity Level
at Current Purchasing Power
Parities for China, Index USA =
1, Annual, Not Seasonally
Adjusted

Federal Reserve Economic
Data, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis

Exports of goods and services in
current USD

World Bank national accounts
data, and OECD National
Accounts data files.

54

Import

Human Capital Index

Labor force participation

Total labor force

Inflation

Capital Stock

Imports of goods and services in
current USD
Human capital index, based on
years of schooling and returns to
education

World Bank national accounts
data, and OECD National
Accounts data files.

Penn World Table

Labor force participation rate,
total (% of total population ages
15+)

International Labour
Organization, ILOSTAT
database. Data retrieved on June
15, 2021.

Labor force, total

Derived using data from
International Labour
Organization, ILOSTAT
database. The data retrieved on
June 15, 2021.

Inflation, consumer prices for
China, Percent, Annual

Federal Reserve Economic
Data, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis

Capital Stock at Constant
National Prices for China,
Millions of 2017 U.S. Dollars,
Annual, Not Seasonally
Adjusted

Federal Reserve Economic
Data, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis

Table 5: Data Description
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